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ABSTRACT 
The adequate monitoring of the flight parameters in the 
cockpit is a critical issue for flight safety. However, little is 
known about how the crew supervises the flight deck. In 
this paper, the preliminary results of a project dedicated to 
analyze pilot flying and pilot monitoring eyes movements 
collected in full flight simulator during approach phases are 
presented.  First analyses were conducted over 32 approach 
phases (8 different crews performing 4 approaches each). 
The results revealed that the pilot flying and the pilot 
monitoring exhibited similar ocular behavior during the 
approach. Moreover, the findings suggested that the pilot 
monitoring’s attentional allocation may not be optimal 
especially during the short final with low percentage of 
dwell time on the speed indicator and high percentage of 
dwell time out of the window. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Operating an aircraft is a complex activity that requires 
efficient teamwork between the Captain and the First 
Officer (F/O). During flight operations, the two 
crewmembers can be alternatively either “Pilot Flying” 
(PF) or “Pilot Monitoring” (PM). Their roles as PF and PM 
are defined by the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
[18] : 
- The PF is responsible for managing the aircraft flight 
path and gives orders to the PM.  
- The PM is responsible for monitoring the current and 
projected trajectory, the status (e.g. flight path, energy) 
of the aircraft and all external hazards (e.g. 
cumulonimbus). 
- The PM must inform the PF (or intervenes if necessary) 
of any deviation of the flight parameters, and executes 
the PF’s orders. 
This distribution of roles emphasizes on the adequate 
monitoring of the cockpit, thus challenging pilots’ 
attentional abilities. However, it is well admitted that 
attentional abilities are bounded. Recent studies have 
shown that the occurrence of unexpected events is likely to 
capture human operator’s attention on a single task to the 
detriment of the supervision of the flight [5] despite 
auditory alarms [6]. Operational fatigue and drowsiness 
may lead to the state of mind wandering, leaving the pilot’s 
ill equipped to face complex and challenging situations 
when a problem arises [9]. As stated by [2]: “Real-world 
monitors may be caught between a continuous vigilance 
approach that is doomed to fail, a dynamic environment 
that cannot be fully controlled, and what may be an 
irresistible urge to let one’s thoughts drift.” The National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) stated that poor 
monitoring issues were involved in most of major civilian 
accidents, such as Colgan Air Flight 3407 [15], Asiana Air 
Flight 214 [14], Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 [10], Air Inter 
Flight 148 or more recently the UPS Airlines Flight 1354 
[13] to name a few [4]. The growing awareness of the need 
to better understand these events motivated the creation of 
the Active Pilot Monitoring Group. This group identified 
several contributive factors such as time pressure, human 
limitation, poor mental models, automated flight deck 
issues and a “corporate climate that does not emphasis on 
monitoring”. This work resulted in the “Practical Guide for 
Improving Flight Path Monitoring” that proposes several 
countermeasures to crew’s poor monitoring [11]. 
However, little is known on how the crewmember actually 
monitors the flight deck and cross-check the flight 
parameters especially during critical phases such as the 
approach [3].  To that end, measuring eyes movements with 
eye-tracking technique offers promising perspective to 
undercover pilots’ voluntary or not attentional strategies. 
Several studies revealed the suitability of the eye tracking 
technique for understanding attentional vulnerabilities of 
pilots interacting with highly automated flight deck [7][17].  
 
In order to better understand why trained pilots fail 
sometimes to adequately monitor flight parameters, the 
DGAC/DSAC initiated the Pilot Vision project. This 
project aimed at analyzing eye tracking data collected by 
ISAE in different full flight simulators (Airbus-A330 and 
Boeing-777 full flight simulators) during approach phase 
preceding a go-around procedure.  
In this paper, a first analysis conducted over 32 approaches 
is detailed. The aim of this study was to address the 
following questions: 1) In which proportion do the PF and 
the PM glances at the different areas of interests (AOIs) of 
the cockpit flight deck during the approach? 2) Does the 
monitoring in line with the SOPs? 3) Does the pilots’ status 
(Captain versus First Officer) interfere with the pilots’ role 
in the cockpit (PM versus PF)?  
 
 
Figure 1 — Heatmaps examples of a Captain when he is PM (on top) and 
a First Officer when he is PF (at the bottom), between 1500 and 500 ft (the 
two pictures come from an Airbus A330 cockpit). The ‘hot’ zones where 
the users focused their gaze with a higher frequency are indicated by 
yellow/red colors whereas less attended zones are depicted in dark/blue 
colors. 
MATERIAL AND METHOD 
Participants 
Eight voluntary French crews (i.e., one Captain and one 
First Officer) coming from different airlines, 16 pilots in 
total, took part to the experiment. The roles of the Captains 
and the First Officers (i.e., PM and PF) varied during the 
flight (see next section). PFs’ mean age was 46.5 years (SD 
= 7.7) with a mean flight experience of 14450 hours (SD = 
2192). PMs were on average 41.3 years (SD = 4.3), with a 
mean flight experience of 7991 hours (SD = 2795). 
Eye-tracker and Areas of Interest 
Eye tracking data were collected with two synchronized 
Pertech eye-trackers (0.25° – 0.5° of accuracy). Head 
movements were corrected by an alignment of three infra-
red emitters to map participants’ fixations on an image of 
reference (see Figure 1 for a graphical view). The 15 
following AOIs were created (see Figure 2): 1) Airspeed 
(Speed), 2) Attitude indicator (AI), 3) Altitude indicator 
(Alt.), 4) Heading (HDG), 5) Flight Mode Annunciator 
(FMA), 6) Navigation Display (ND), 7) Electronic 
Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) for Airbus-A330 and 
Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) for 
Boeing-777, 8) left Multipurpose Control Display Unit 
(MCDU), 9) right MCDU, 10) External view (Ext.), 11) 
Auto Flight Control Panel: Flight Control Unit (FCU) for 
Airbus-330 and Multi Control Panel (MCP) for Boeing-
777, 12) Flaps  control panel (Flaps), 13) landing gears 
control panel (Gears), 14 ) No Zone (NZ; i.e. all what is 
being viewed and which does not correspond to an AOI), 
and 15) Out of Zone (OZ; i.e. including all the data that 
was not captured by the device; this is not an AOI but a 
non-captured quantity of data). 
 
Figure 2 — Example of Captain’s AOIs delimiting flight deck 
instruments (Airbus A330). 
Average percentage of dwell time on each AOI was 
calculated for each participant, for each approach. 
 
Procedure 
Data were collected during the ASAGA project (Aeroplane 
State Awareness during Go-Around) leaded by the Bureau 
d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses (BEA), the French safety board. 
This project was dedicated to the study of PM and PF’s eye 
movements during go-around procedures (GA) in Boeing 
777 and Airbus A330 full flight simulators, equitably 
distributed over the crews (please note that these two 
aircraft simulators were not equipped with a head-up 
display) [1]. During the experiment, the crews executed 
four different approach procedures: the first three leading to 
a GA during the short final and the last one leading to a 
landing. We unfortunately did not counterbalance the order 
of the landings across the participants due to 
implementation constraints in the full flight simulators. In 
the present paper, we focused our analyses on the four 
approaches. Each approach was segregated into three 
phases: 2500 – 1500 ft, 1500 – 500 ft and 500 ft – TOGA 
or touch down (this last phase was temporally delimited 
when the PF put his hands and the thrust levers in order to 
execute the GA). In the two first scenarios, the Captain was 
PF and the First Officer was PM. In the last two scenarios, 
the Captain was PM and the First Officer was PF. 
Approach 1) GA requested from ATC (Captain = PF, First 
Officer = PM): While the crew began an approach on 
runway 18 at Lyon airport, ATC announced a change in the 
selected runway then requested an Instrument Landing 
System (ILS) break in 36 left under radar guidance to 
occupy the crew during approach. Under 200 ft, runway 
was occupied and ATC requested for an unexpected GA. 
This first GA was ordered by ATC and disrupted by a 
change in the aimed altitude.  
Approach 2) GA due to tailwind conditions (Captain = PF, 
First Officer = PM): The crew had to change aircraft 
course to Marseille airport in accordance with the flight 
record. They had to execute a standard ILS 31 right Z 
approach, with tailwind will increase from 15 to 20 kt. 
ATC effectively announced this wind conditions change 
only during short final approach. The crew was expected to 
perform a GA.  
Approach 3) GA due to IMC (Captain = PM, First Officer 
= PF): Still above Marseille airport, the crew had to make a 
breakthrough LOC DME 13 left under radar guidance. 
However, poor visibility led the crew to execute a GA.  
Approach 4) and landing (Captain = PM, First Officer = 
PF): After the third GA, the crew managed to land on 
Marseille Airport. 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive analysis 
The next figures illustrate our descriptive results. We first 
merged AOIs related to the primary and secondary 
instruments for both PF and PM (see Figure 3). Then, the 
average percentage of dwell time on the different AOIs in 
two different ways was plotted to highlight the possible 
interactions between pilot’s status and role (see Figure 4). 
  
Figure 3 — Average dwell time for PF (on the left) and PM (on the right), regarding Primary instruments (i.e. Airspeed, Heading, Attitude and Altitude 
indicators), Secondary instruments (i.e. FMA, ND, ECAM/ECAIS, FCU/MCP, MCDUs, Flaps panel, and landing Gears), External view, Out of Zone (OZ) 
and No Zone (NZ). 
 
  
Figure 4 — Average dwell time per AOI, per role then per status (on the left), and per status then per role (on the right), for all the four approaches. 
Eventually, the last figure illustrates PF and PM average percentage of dwell time during the three segments of the approach. 
 
Figure 5 — Average dwell time per AOI, per phases and roles, over all approaches. 
 
Statistical analyses  
Primary vs. secondary instruments 
Approaches 1 and 2 were averaged into a first single 
situation in which Captain was PF and First Officer was 
PM, and approaches 3 and 4 were averaged into a second 
single situation in which Captain was PM and First Officer 
was PF. 
AOIs were first merged into two main groups, which are 
Primary instruments and Secondary instruments (see Figure 
3). These two groups were taken as grouped AOIs then 
compared with External view, NZ and OZ.  
A first inferential analysis was performed using Statistica 
10. A general mixed 5 × 2 × 2 (Grouped AOIs [Primary 
instruments, Secondary instruments, Ext., OZ, NZ] × Role 
[PF, PM] × Status [Captain, First Officer]) analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with both Grouped AOIs and Role 
implemented as within factors and Status implemented as 
between factor. 
This first ANOVA revealed a main effect of the AOIs, 
[F(4, 56) = 115.00, p < .001, η²p = .89], and a Role × 
Grouped AOIs interaction [F(4, 56) = 17.00, p < .001, η²p = 
.55] (see next Table 1 for a summary of the results). 
 
General ANOVA (with grouped AOIs) 
Variable ddl F p η²p 
Grouped AOIs 4, 56 115.00  < .001* .89 
Role 1, 14 1.00 .29 .08 
Status 1, 14 1.00 .44 .04 
Role × Status 1, 14 1.00 .30 .08 
Role × gr. AOIs 4, 56 17.00 < .001* .55 
Status × gr. AOIs 4, 56 1.00 .43 .07 
Role × gr. AOIs × Status 4, 56 1.00 .60 .05 
Table 1 — Results from 5 AOIs (Primary instruments, Secondary 
instruments, Ext., OZ and NZ) × 2 Roles × 2 Status ANOVA. 
Tukey’s HSD post hoc analysis for Role × Grouped AOIs 
interaction showed that PF (M = 51.59, SD = 12.11) fixed 
more at primary instruments than PM (M = 35.74, SD = 
7.09, p < .001). No other significant result was found. 
Considering all AOIs separately 
A second general mixed 14 × 2 × 2 (AOIs [Speed, Attitude 
indicator, Altitude indicator, Heading, FMA, ND, 
ECAM/ECAIS, FCU/MCP, left MCDU, right MCDU, 
Flaps, External view, NZ, OZ] × Role [PF, PM] × Status 
[Captain, First Officer]) ANOVA with both AOI and Role 
implemented as within factors and Status implemented as 
between factor, was performed (see Table 2 for the results). 
Data collected for Gears AOI being not balanced because 
they were missing for one session, the study does not 
integrate them into the statistical analyses. 
This ANOVA showed a main effect of the role [F(1, 13) = 
46.24, p < .001, η²p = .780]. The analysis revealed a second 
main effect of the AOIs, [F(13, 169) = 66.27, p < .001, η²p 
= .84] and a Role × AOIs interaction [F(13, 169) = 15.23, p 
< .001, η²p = .54]. 
 
General ANOVA  
Variable ddl F p η²p 
AOIs 13, 169 66.27 < .001* .84 
Role 1, 13 46.24 < .001* .78 
Status 1, 13 .14 .72 .01 
Role × Status 1, 13 .36 .56 .03 
Role × AOIs 13, 169 15.23 < .001* .54 
Status × AOIs 13, 169 1.75 .06 .12 
Role × AOIs × Status 13, 169 1.52 .12 .11 
Table 2 — Results from 14 AOIs × 2 Roles × 2 Status general ANOVA. 
To simplify statistical analyses, twelve different mixed 
ANOVAs were launched, one per AOI (i.e. Airspeed, 
Attitude and Altitude indicators, Heading, FMA, ND, 
ECAM/ECAIS, FCU, MCDUs, Flaps panel and External 
view). 
For each AIO, a mixed 2 × 2 (Role [PF, PM] × Status 
[Captain, First Officer]) ANOVA was run with Role 
implemented as within factor and Status implemented as 
between factor. Tukey honest significant difference 
(Tukey’s HSD) was used for post hoc testing.  
Airspeed. The analysis revealed a main effect of status 
[F(1, 14) = 5.60, p < .05, η²p = .29], with Captains (M = 
5.96, SD = 1.42) glancing significantly less at the Airspeed 
indicator than First Officers (M  = 8.38, SD = 2.53). A 
trend was found for the role, [F(1, 14) = 4.03,  p = .06, η²p 
= .22], with PF (M = 7.79, SD = 6.17) having high values 
for this AOI than PM (M = 6.55, SD = 4.96). The analysis 
showed a significant Role × Status interaction [F(1, 14) = 
6.14, p < .05, η²p = .31]. Post hoc analyses revealed that 
Captains gazed more at the airspeed when they were PF (M 
= 7.35, SD = 6.24) than when they were PM (M = 4.57, SD 
= 3.07, p < .05). When endorsing the role of PM, First 
Officer glanced significantly more at the Airspeed indicator 
(M = 8.53, SD = 5.68) than Captains (M = 4.57, SD = 3.07, 
p < .05).  Finally, no difference on this AOI where found 
when First Officers acted as PF or PM. 
Attitude indicator. The statistical analysis revealed a main 
effect of role [F(1, 14) = 31.42, p < .001, η²p = .69], with 
PFs spending more time staring at the attitude indicator (M 
= 30.96, SD = 18.57) than PMs (M = 16.19, SD = 8.14). No 
effect of the status, nor Role × Status interaction were 
found. 
Altitude indicator. The analysis revealed a significant 
Role × Status interaction [F(1, 14)  = 11.61, p < .01, η²p = 
.45], but the post hoc analysis revealed no significant 
differences. No PM/PF difference and no effect of the 
status  were found.  
Heading. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
status [F(1, 14) = 10.33, p < .01, η²p = .43], with Captains 
glancing more (M = 5.19, SD = 2.92) at the Heading 
indicator than First Officers (M = 1.53, SD = 1.37). The 
analysis revealed no significant effect between PM and PF, 
or Role × Status interaction. 
ECAM/ECAIS. The statistical analysis for this AOI 
revealed a significant main effect of role [F(1, 14) = 14.55, 
p < 0.1, η²p = .51] with PFs (M = 2.18, SD = 2.98) glancing 
less at the ECAM/ECAIS than PMs (M = 3.92, SD = 4.03, 
p < .01). No effect of status nor Role × Status interaction 
were found. 
Right MCDU. The statistical analysis revealed a main 
effect of role [F(1, 14) = 5.04, p < 0.5, η²p = .27], with PM 
(M = 1.60, SD = 4.01) spending more time on it than PF (M 
= .53, SD = 1.36, p < .05). A significant main effect of 
status was found [F(1, 14) = 5.80, p < 0.5, η²p = .29], with 
Captains (M = .34, SD = 1.13) glancing less at it than First 
Officers (M = 1.79, SD = 4.02, p < .05). A significant Role 
× Status interaction was also found [F(1, 14) = 8.99, p < 
0.1, η²p = .39]. Post hoc analysis revealed that First Officers 
glanced more at it when they were PM (M = 3.04, SD = 
5.30) than when they were PF (M = .53, SD = 1.16, p < 
.05). Moreover, First Officers glanced more at right MCDU 
(M = 3.04, SD = 5.30) than Captains (M = .16, SD = .34, p 
< .01) where they were both PM. 
 
No statistical result was found for the following 
instruments: FMA, ND, FCU/MCP, Left MCDU, Flaps 
panel and External view. 
 
To summarize, these statistical analyses revealed that: 
(i) PF fixed more the Primary instruments (Attitude and 
Altitude indicators, Speed and Heading) than PM (see 
Table 1); 
(ii) PF and PM exhibited almost similar average 
percentage of dwell time on the Airspeed, Altitude 
indicator, Heading (i.e. three out of four primary 
instruments), FMA, ND, FCU/MCP, left MCDU, 
Flaps panel (the most part of secondary instruments), 
and moreover External view AOIs; 
(iii) The PF glanced more at the Attitude Indicator than the 
PM; 
(iv) The status of the pilot led them to glance differently at 
primary instruments Airspeed (more fixed by First 
Officers) and Heading (more fixed by Captains); 
(v) There is also a Role × Status interaction on Airspeed: 
with PM–First Officers glancing more at the Airspeed 
than PM–Captains. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The objective of the present paper was to present the 
preliminary findings conducted over eight crews 
performing four stabilized approaches (i.e. 32 analyses). 
The main motivation was to investigate PM and PF’s 
ocular behavior (in terms of dwell times) with regard to 
SOPs. To the authors’ knowledge, this study was the first to 
measure both PM and PF’s eye movements in the context 
of realistic operational scenario, with multi-crew 
environment in full flight simulator and during approach 
phases.  
Firstly, the results confirmed that both pilots glanced more 
at the primary flight parameters than the secondary ones. 
This is consistent with the SOPs as it is mandatory for 
pilots to particularly monitor the parameters such as the 
aircraft attitude, the speed, the altitude and the heading.  
We also note that the rank ordering of the different AOIs is 
closely correlated with the scan data of PF observed by 
[17], for commercial PF and for pilots [7]. 
Secondly, the results showed that the PF and the PM 
exhibited the same ocular behavior at the exception of the 
Attitude indicator. Indeed, the PF glanced more at the 
Attitude indicator than the PM. Though this latter result is 
consistent with the SOPs (i.e. the PF is in charge of 
monitoring the trajectory), one could have expected more 
pronounced differences between the PF and the PM’s 
ocular behavior. Indeed, these two pilots are supposed to 
behave differently as defined by the SOPs. We found no 
effect of the status on the pilots’ behavior to the exception 
of the speed indicator. That is, whatever their status and 
experience (i.e. Captains are more experienced than First 
Officers), all PMs and PFs behaved the same way. Only the 
Captains, when they were PM, glanced more at the airspeed 
indicator than when they were PF. However, Captains 
fixated less this critical AOI than First Officers.  
Thirdly, results suggested that PMs’ visual behavior was 
not optimal regarding the prioritization of the flight 
parameters. For instance, PMs spent few time monitoring 
the speed during the three sequences of the approach. PMs 
progressively redistributed their attention across the three 
segments to particularly focus on the external view. This 
was particularly true during the last sequence (500 ft to 
GA/touch down) when PMs spend approximately 35% of 
the time on the external view. This finding is surprising as 
long as PMs are supposed to keep their head down to 
monitor critical flight parameters related to the aircraft 
state. This possible misallocation of attention could find 
two explanations. The first one is that the pilots can 
monitor the speed using peripheral vision/covert attention 
thanks to the “speed trend vector” [7] (i.e. an arrow 
indicating the speed value in the next 10 seconds). This 
indicator can lead to less eye movements to integrate 
“trends” of the speed rather than the exact value of the 
speed itself. A second explanation may rely on automation 
bias issues [16] leading the pilots to over rely on the auto-
thrust to manage the speed, and thus to pay less attention to 
this parameter. These issues on the speed indicator could 
provide explanation to recent accidents such as Asiana Air 
Flight 214 for example, when the pilots failed to identify a 
critical drop of the speed [14]. 
Eventually a last result concerned the right MCDU: the 
PMs glanced more at it compared to PFs, and the First 
Officers fixated more this AOI when they were PM than 
when they were PF, and they also glanced more than 
Captains in general. This has to do with the fact that the 
PM used this user interface to check wind conditions 
during approach 3. 
 
CONCLUSION, PERSPECTIVES AND LIMITATION OF 
THE STUDY 
We believe that these first results demonstrate the need to 
conduct eye tracking studies to undercover both PM and PF 
eye movements during critical phases such as landing. 
These first findings show that there is a need to establish 
standards on visual pattern especially for PM and PF to be 
consistent with SOPs. These eye tracking results are 
consistent with pilots’ training purposes recently 
recommended by the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), stated that “by March 2019, air carriers must 
include specific training pertaining to improve 
monitoring”. 
However, this study has several limitations that need to be 
considered. First, the eye tracking results have to be taken 
with care. Indeed, our sample was composed of only 16 
pilots (eight crews) and the accuracy of eye-tracking 
techniques still remains a challenge, especially in 
ecological conditions. Secondly we did not counterbalance 
properly the order and the design (i.e. PF, PM) of the four 
approaches. This design was imposed by the ASAGA 
project and the complexity of using full flight simulators. 
Thirdly, this study was conducted with French pilots and 
thus it does not take into account cultural effect. Actually, 
it’s known that several differences exist between countries 
concerning the conduct of checklists and procedures [12].  
Eventually, our study will continue with the analyses of the 
remaining data collected during the ASAGA project (i.e. 
four more crews – 16 approaches), and other data collected 
during unstabilized approach (4 landings × 28 PFs) in 
Boeing-737 full flight simulator. 
Focus should be placed on the analysis of pilots’ ocular 
dynamics via their scan path, and other eye metrics such as 
saccades, number of fixations, or time duration between 
two fixations, for example [8].  
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